ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a clean-slate design of a novel and practical protocol for transporting refreshed symmetric keys for multi-path big data ingestion systems. Our objective is to securely and reliably deliver the refreshed keys from data sources to the data collection servers even in the presence of malicious attackers. To satisfy this objective, we first adapt the secret sharing algorithm. We split symmetric keys into multiple secrets in such a way that partial retrieval of the secrets does not warrant the reconstruction of the original key. Then, we hide the updated secret keys by shuffling them into a group of randomly generated fake keys. These keys are encapsulated in a message container called a bluff. We develop a protocol that makes it computationally infeasible for the attackers to distinguish between bluffs and normal data. We implement and test this protocol on Apache Flume, which is a widely used, state-of-the-art data ingestion system. We analyze the security aspects of our protocol and observe the effects of various configuration settings on the data ingestion performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big data processing procedures normally start by collecting a large volume of data from multiple sources. In this paper, we focus on developing an efficient approach to secure the big data ingestion operation, specifically in the following settings. First, the data are collected in chunks over multiple paths for efficient utilization of the network and reliable delivery. Second, the data are constantly ingested. Third, the data are transferred over non-secure public Internet. This challenge is motivated by the recent call for solutions by the South Korean Ministry of Education. The ministry needs to collect students' private information and network usage data from every affiliated metropolitan and provincial educational office. Resources for data storage at each educational office are managed and budgeted autonomously. The edge data storage at each education office has to transport data to the central data collection servers via the Internet. Each data storage server is equipped with multiple network interfaces such that multiple transport paths can be set up.
To secure the multi-path ingestion channel, we can first consider securing each end-to-end ingestion path with encryption using symmetric or asymmetric keys. Symmetric keys such as AES are known to be fast and efficient in encrypting and decrypting messages [1] . However, the symmetric key can be exposed to malicious attackers when it is exchanged between two endpoints. For secure key exchanges, a sophisticated key agreement protocol should be enforced [2] - [5] . In the case of encryption based on asymmetric keys such as RSA, only the public keys have to be distributed to the data forwarding endpoints. However, encrypting and decrypting messages are relatively slow with asymmetric keys [6] . SSL/TLS [7] is a hybrid approach that uses a private/public key pair for securely sharing symmetric keys between communication endpoints.
However, we question whether blindly employing SSL/TLS is sufficient to guarantee security without affecting the data ingestion performance. As mentioned above, constant streams of data chunks are generated. Months of unceasing transfer of these data chunks with SSL/TLS can open the possibility of private keys being revealed to adversaries [8] . To prevent any potential private key compromise, private and public key pairs have to be routinely refreshed.
In the case of SSL/TLS, keys are refreshed for every new session. Although this approach is useful for applications that serve short-lived sessions, it is inefficient for the longrunning sessions that are typical in big data ingestion systems.
We address the above issue by extending our previous work that adapts secret sharing [9] , [10] . We first split the keys into multiple pieces according to an (N , K ) secret sharing scheme. The split keys are then sent to the receivers through N paths. As soon as K pieces are received, the original messages can be reconstructed at the receiver side. This method, which we called secret forwarding, was applied to multi-hop and multipath overlay networks of publish/subscribe brokers [10] . The key benefit of this approach is that the key propagation is resilient to path failures and Byzantine brokers. Additionally, there is no need to maintain a separate key for every path. However, our previous work did not adequately address the key update mechanism. In our previous work, we assumed that the message containing a split piece of a refreshed key is tagged with a special attribute in the message header. However, such crude indication of secret keys can attract adversaries to collect messages with the special tags and attempt to reconstruct the secret key.
Our previous work focused on addressing the failures caused by the Byzantine brokers with secret sharing techniques. In this paper, we focus on securely transporting the split pieces of refreshed keys to the receiving ends without disrupting the continuous ingestion of data chunks for big data processing. To the best of our knowledge, this objective is novel in big data systems.
Our contributions are presented in the following order. (1) We provide a clean-slate design of a novel protocol called bluff forwarding. This protocol shuffles split secret keys into a message container called a bluff that contains randomly generated fake keys. Bluffs are sent to the receivers along with other normal messages that share the multi-path channels. We show that distinguishing between bluffs and normal messages is computationally infeasible. Additionally, we qualitatively assess the large overhead of reconstructing split secret keys that are spread across different bluffs. (2) We explain how our protocol is implemented in a popular state-of-the-art data ingestion system called Apache Flume that uses SSL/TLS for data encryption on each data transfer path [11] . We quantitatively assess the effects of various configurations of our protocol on the data ingestion performance compared to the case where SSL/TLS is turned on. (3) Finally, we conclude and suggest interesting directions for future work.
II. DESIGN OF THE BLUFF FORWARDING PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a novel protocol that we refer to as bluff forwarding. This protocol works in an environment where clients send a constant stream of data to servers securely through a multi-path ingestion channel. The goal of this protocol is to securely deliver a refreshed symmetric key from a client to a server even in the presence of malicious attackers. Moreover, we aim to design the update procedure such that disruption to the on-going stream transfers is minimized.
In the following, we explain the structure of control messages and show how these messages are exchanged between client and server. Then, we analyze and discuss the key characteristics of this protocol.
A. THE STRUCTURE OF CONTROL MESSAGES
As shown in Fig. 1 , all data, including the control messages, are wrapped in a data structure called a message container. The message container consists of two parts: a header and a body. The header is a 4-byte message code, which is used as a message type distinguisher and a signal to trigger the usage of the new decryption key on the server side. The body portion contains the content, which is encrypted with a symmetric key. The first message type is a normal message that has to be constantly collected by the server. The second message type is a control message that we refer to as a bluff. A bluff is a set of KPCs. A KPC is a 3-tuple of symmetric key, previous key code and current key code, that two key codes are abbreviated as pCode and cCode, respectively. The symmetric key is the key for encrypting and decrypting KPCs and normal messages.
A symmetric key is either a true key or a dummy key. A dummy key is a fake key that is intended to confuse attackers. The true symmetric key is the refreshed key that should be delivered to the server. Each bluff contains a mixture of dummy keys and may have a true key. Whether to include a true key in a bluff is decided randomly. The pair of pCode and cCode is used for identifying an updated true key from a succeeding bluff. Upon the receipt of a bluff, the server first keeps a copy of pCode in a variable for cCode. Upon the receipt of a subsequent bluff, the server checks whether the bluff contains a pCode that matches its cCode. If a match exists, then the server takes this as a sign of the delivery of a new true key.
B. THE ARCHITECTURE OF MULTI-PATH DATA INGESTION SYSTEM
The bluff forwarding protocol runs on a multi-path data ingestion system that involves four main entities, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . The key generator is responsible for generating and splitting keys. The transmitter forwards message containers to the receivers on the server side. Upon the receipt of message containers, the receiver determines whether the message is a bluff or a normal message by examining the message code. If the message is a bluff, then it is relayed to the key reconstructor for reconstructing the refreshed key.
Note that multiple paths are established between transmitters and receivers. A message container that holds nonbluff data is forwarded through one of the multiple paths. We assume that transmitters and receivers have multiple network interfaces that can form separate connections. Each path is constructed on every separate connection. This is typical for big data ingestion systems to maximize the network capacity and throughput. We take advantage of these multiple paths to securely deliver the bluff. A bluff is split into pieces using secret sharing with an (n, k) scheme, where n is the number of paths and k is the minimum number of pieces required to reconstruct the original bluff [9] . In other words, the original bluff cannot be reconstructed unless more than k pieces are collected. Fig. 3 shows the sequence diagram of the bluff forwarding protocol.
C. THE PROCEDURE OF KEY UPDATES
The first step is to generate and split a bluff. The key generator decides the size of a bluff randomly. The size is measured as the number of dummy keys and true key to be included in the bluff. Attackers may easily infer the message type if the size is fixed. Note that the key generator randomly decides when to create a bluff. Additionally, given the bluff, whether to include a KPC containing a true key is randomly decided. That is, the next cycle for creating a bluff and including a KPC with a valid key is randomly selected. Suppose that the key generator does include a true key in the KPC tuple. The pCode of this KPC becomes the cCode of the previous valid KPC sent to the server. For example, a true key encrypted as ''ouknothk'' is placed among dummy keys in a bluff, as shown in Fig. 4 .
Every KPC tuple in a bluff is split into pieces using the (n, k) secret sharing scheme. Here, n is the number of multiple paths between the client and the server. k is the minimum number of pieces required to reconstruct the original message. For example, each KPC tuple is split into 3 pieces, as shown in Fig. 5 . The split pieces of encrypted KPC tuples are grouped together. Each split piece of the KPC tuple containing the true key piece is inserted into one of the groups. An example is shown in Fig. 6 .
Each group is then encapsulated in a message container, as shown in Fig. 7 . Given n paths between transmitters and the server-side receivers, n message containers are created. The key generator assigns message containers to each delivery path, respectively. Prior to forwarding the message container through the assigned path, the transmitter sets the message type distinguisher for each message container. If the message container contains a bluff, a prereserved bluff indicator is set in the message code field in the VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 5. Splitting each KPC tuple using secret sharing. header. This bluff indication code is used to inform the server that a bluff is being sent. This code is actually the trigger code previously sent to the server to trigger the process of decrypting messages using the refreshed symmetric key in the preceding bluff.
The receiver on the server side checks whether the received message container has a bluff by looking for the reserved bluff indication code in the message code field. When the receiver detects that a message container contains a bluff, it forwards the encrypted content to the key reconstructor. Once the key reconstructor receives k pieces from the receivers, it decrypts the content and starts to reconstruct the original KPC tuples. Whenever the key reconstructor finds the reserved pCode in the reconstructed KPC tuple, it stops the reconstruction operation and retrieves the true symmetric key. An example of this process is shown in Fig. 8 .
We assume that bluffs are received in the order that they were sent. We guarantee this situation by forcing the client to wait until it receives a confirmation from the server that the previous bluff with true key pieces was successfully reconstructed. After receiving the confirmation of the successful reconstruction, the client creates a new message code that is used as a signal to trigger the decryption using the refreshed key. We refer to this code as a trigger code. This trigger code is created separately for each path and is sent to the server. Note that this trigger code also functions as a bluff indication code for the succeeding bluffs.
As soon as the server acknowledges the receipt of the trigger code, clients start to encrypt messages with the refreshed symmetric key. Extra caution is needed to avoid the case where previous message code is re-used as a trigger code. Suppose that there is a pending message container M in the transmitter. Moreover, suppose that M is tagged with the message code that is the same as the newly generated trigger code. Before receiving the message that is encrypted with the new symmetric key, M will arrive to the server first. Then, the server may mistakenly take this as a signal to start the decryption with the newly reconstructed symmetric key, although the message container can only be decrypted properly by the old key. Therefore, the key generator ensures that a new trigger code is not the same as the message codes of the pending message containers in each transmitter. This is why the key generator sweeps through the message queue on each transmitter prior to determining a trigger code. After the new key takes effect on the new server, the trigger code is not re-used as a message code until the following bluffs are generated. As mentioned earlier, when a new bluff is generated, the last trigger code is used as a bluff indication code.
The protocol that we have explained thus far is specified more formally and precisely in Algorithms 1, 2, 3 and 4.
D. THREAT ANALYSIS
We analyze the threat to this protocol by assessing the overhead that the adversaries have to pay to reconstruct the refreshed key.
Our threat model is specified as follows. We assume that the adversaries cannot acquire root privilege to infiltrate into the two endpoints: client and server. Therefore, while residing on the two endpoints, the necessary pieces of information for completing the key update (e.g., bluff indication code and pCode) cannot be compromised. However, the adversaries are assumed to have full access to the communication channels. Therefore, the attackers can eavesdrop on the network and attempt to infer the key from a collection of network packets in various ways. The detailed scheme of the protocol is also exposed to the adversaries. That is, the attackers may know the full structure of the message container and content in a bluff. We show that our protocol is secure even under these hostile conditions.
The endpoints only exhibit benign failures, such as crash failure and message drops. Byzantine endpoints or impersonating clients corrupting the messages are serious issues. However, handling man-in-the-middle attacks is beyond the 9 Create new message header newMsgHeader 10 Assign eventCode to newMsgHeader 11 Delete message header 12 Assign newMsgHeader to message as header 13 Send message to server scope of this paper. Instead, we can guarantee forward secrecy by employing security protocols such as those presented in [5] and [12] . As shown in Fig. 9 , assume that the attacker collected message containers over time window X in all delivery paths. Additionally, assume that the collected message containers from each delivery path contain a bluff which has a split piece of the refreshed key. Suppose that the attacker collected N 1 , N 2 , and N 3 message containers in each path. Given our threat model, the attacker cannot identify a message container that contains the bluff. Under this condition, the attacker has to apply a brute-force method that takes one message container in each path and reconstruct them to figure out whether it is a bluff or not. Hence, the attacker has to examine N 1 *N 2 *N 3 sets in total. For each set, the attacker has to run (T N 1 , T N 2 , T N 3 ) secret reconstruction operations, where T N i is the number of KPC tuples of each message container in N i . Therefore, the complexity of this computation is O(TN C ) in general, where C is the number of paths and T is the number of KPC tuples. However, there is no guarantee that the message containers collected over time window X actually contain any bluffs. Moreover, even if a bluff exists, the bluff may not even contain the refreshed true key because the key generator on the client side determines the next key generation cycle randomly.
Suppose that we relax the threat model and assume that adversaries can somehow steal the bluff indication code. The attackers have to decrypt messages with all reconstructed keys (including the dummy keys). Even in this case, the attackers are still left puzzled because the adversaries cannot know pCode that indicates a true key. The attackers thus have no way to verify the validity of decrypted content. Adversaries have to steal pCode to figure out the original key. However, the only way to steal pCode is by breaking into the server, which contradicts our threat model.
In the following section, we evaluate the effects of the bluff forwarding protocol on the data ingestion performance.
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we test our bluff forwarding protocol on Apache Flume, which is a widely used, state-of-the-art big data system for collecting, aggregating and moving large amounts of log data from many different data sources to a centralized data store [11] . With customizable data sources, Flume can be used to transport massive quantities of various event data. We implemented bluff forwarding agents on Flume clients that transfer network usage data of metropolitan and provincial educational offices to the central servers at the Korean Ministry of Education, as illustrated in Fig. 10 . Flume agents that follow the bluff forwarding protocol are implemented on Ubuntu machines with Intel i3 dual-core CPUs and 8 GB of RAM. These machines are connected to a network switch with a 24 Gbps backplane capacity.
There are two data sources on the bluff-sending Flume agent: key source and message source. The message source distributes network flow information that was produced at educational offices. A network flow is meta-data of endto-end communications such as source and destination IPs and ports, types of network protocols used, network traffic volume and application types. These data are extracted and collected by a network appliance that conducts deep packet inspection (DPI) on a set of network packets [13] .
The key source distributes split pieces of bluffs that are generated by the secret splitter. The key generator generates a new bluff at a random time interval. Each bluff piece is buffered into the message queue attached to one of the Flume channel objects. Each channel aggregates the bluff pieces and the normal events into a data chunk. One of the sinks takes these data chunks and transfers them to the data sources on the bluff-receiving Flume agent. Flume uses a transactional approach to guarantee the reliable delivery of the events (bluff pieces and network flow events). The event in the message queue of each channel is kept until the receiving agent confirms the receipt of the events. The capacity of the message queues and the maximum number of events to forward for each transaction is configurable.
Using the test environment, we observed the effects of bluff size, bluff update intervals and secret forwarding scheme settings on the data delivery performance. We compared our system against the one that used ephemeral keys based on SSL. We also compared our system with a system that did not use any public key encryption and updates.
For the following experiments, a normal message size is fixed to 300 bytes. In a big data environment, the amount of messages being produced may vary time to time. We used the feature of Flume that collects messages into a batch. Once a batch grows to a pre-configured size, Flume forwards the batch to the bluff receiver.
A. THE EFFECTS OF BLUFF SIZE
In this experiment, we varied the size of a bluff and observed its effect on the latency and throughput of normal messages. We varied the bluff size from 100 to 900. Bluffs were generated every 60 seconds, and we generated 1 normal message per second. We set 5 parallel paths between the bluff sender and the bluff receiver. Secrets were split according to a (5, 3) scheme. That is, at least 3 pieces are needed to reconstruct an original key. The transaction capacity of Flume was set to 100, i.e., a data chunk was sent each time that 100 events were accumulated. Fig. 11 shows the message latency over the transfer progress in terms of the number of messages. At the beginning, we observed long delays because messages had to be in the queue until 100 events were initially collected. Our system started to exhibit constant latency after 1,000 messages were sent.
We show this result from a different angle in Fig. 12 . We show the average latency with varying bluff size. When the bluff size was 100, we observed the lowest average latency. The message latency was even lower than the case where no encryption was used. However, the average latency was the highest when the bluff size was 900. We attribute this phenomenon to the data-chunking feature of Flume. Without encryption, Flume agents wait until a data chunk is filled with 100 events. However, if a bluff is interleaved, then the data chunk can be filled more quickly. Bluffs are produced at a fixed rate. However, when the size of a bluff is large, it will take relatively longer for the receiver to search for a true key. The key generator on the sender side does not generate a bluff until the preceding one is completely checked at the server side. Therefore, a large-size bluff does not expedite the transport of pending messages in the queue. Fig. 13 shows the message throughput with varying bluff sizes. When the bluff size was 100, the throughput was higher VOLUME 6, 2018 than the case where SSL was turned on but lower than the case where no encryption was used. Intermittent bluff messages pushed back some normal messages into later data chunks. This means that all the normal messages were spread out on more data chunks due to the introduction of bluffs.
We did not expect the normal message latency to increase as the bluff size increased. We explain this phenomenon later with the experiments on the effects of various secret sharing scheme settings.
B. THE EFFECTS OF BLUFF UPDATE INTERVAL
In this experiment, we varied the bluff update interval and observed its effect on the latency and throughput of normal messages. We varied the bluff update interval from 10 seconds to 1,000 seconds. The bluff size was fixed to 100. We fixed the normal message input rate to 1 message per second. We set 5 parallel paths between the bluff sender and the bluff receiver. Secrets were split according to a (5, 3) scheme. The transaction capacity of Flume was set to 100. As shown in Fig. 14 , the message latency peaked at a bluff update interval of 50 seconds. Beyond this interval, we observed a sharp decrease in latency. Note that Flume waits until a data chunk is filled with 100 events. With an update interval longer than 100 seconds, normal messages are less interrupted. Fig. 15 shows the message throughput against bluff update intervals. When the interval is longer than 100 seconds, the throughput was slightly higher than the case where SSL was used.
C. THE EFFECTS OF SECRET SHARING SCHEME SETTINGS
In this experiment, we varied the minimum number of secret pieces (k) for reconstructing an updated key and observed its effect on the latency and throughput of normal messages. We fixed the number of message channels to 7, and we varied k from 2 to 6. The bluff update interval and bluff size were fixed to 60 seconds and 100, respectively. The input rate of normal messages was 100 messages per second. Fig. 16 shows that the message latency decreased by approximately 4% when bluff forwarding was used rather 24306 VOLUME 6, 2018 than using SSL. Notably, the latency was the lowest when k was the highest. We determined that the secret reconstructor on the receiver side blocks the normal messages on the source until secret reconstruction with k pieces was completed. This also explains the phenomenon that we observed at the beginning, where a large bluff size caused an increase in normal message latency. This is because busy secret reconstruction work at the secret reconstructor module disrupted the message processing at the receiver-side sources.
As shown in Fig. 17 , the synchronous secret reconstruction had an adverse effect on the normal message throughput compared to SSL. The normal message throughput was approximately 1.3% lower than the case where SSL was used. This performance gap can be improved by revising the secret reconstruction operation to be performed asynchronously.
In summary, injecting a large bluff can have an adverse effect on the performance of normal messages. However, we can alleviate this adverse effect by having a longer bluff update interval. Interestingly, the buffering mechanism of Flume was a factor that affected the performance. For example, with short intervals, data chunks were filled quickly, which accelerated normal message delivery. Meanwhile, more data chunks should be produced due to the introduction of additional bluffs that interleave normal messages on shared transport channels. However, if we set normal messages to have a high priority in entering the data chunks, the throughput can be improved. We observed this situation by keeping the bluff aside until data chunks are first filled with normal messages. Sharing channels is necessary because we want to make the bluffs indistinguishable from normal messages. If bluffs are sent through a dedicated channel, then this means that adversaries can simply focus on sniffing at this channel.
We have determined that the bluff forwarding protocol could exhibit higher performance under certain configurations compared to the case where SSL was used. However, note that the two key update approaches are fundamentally different. The bluff forwarding protocol supports key sharing between two data ingestion endpoints, while every channel is encrypted with a separate key when SSL is enabled.
IV. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce existing security and reliability research works in the context of infrastructure for big data processing. We first examine protocols for secure key exchanges between two parties. Then, we survey security solutions for messaging substrates used in data logging and real-time big data analytics.
Designing a secure key agreement protocol is important for many real-world problems [2] , [3] . Diffie and Hellman developed a protocol that establishes a shared secret between two parties that can be used for secret communication for exchanging data over an insecure public network [14] . This is one of the first implementations of the public key distribution system that was originally conceptualized by Merkel [15] . The two parties jointly exponentiate a generator with random numbers as follows. Two parties (A and B) first agree on the use of a prime number p and a base g (a primitive root module p). Each party selects a secret code s that is not revealed to the other party. Each party computes T = g s %p and sends this value to the other party. Upon the receipt of T , each party computes g T %p, which becomes a common shared secret on both parties. Given g and p, the adversaries need to find the distributed logarithm s. Solving the distributed logarithm problem is normally infeasible with conventional computers. However, the problem solving speed has significantly improved over the years through recent advancements in number field sieve algorithms on high-capacity parallel computers [16] - [18] . For example, Joux and Lercier [17] were able to compute a 431-bit strong prime number in 3 weeks using a discrete logarithm module. Our protocol does not use the multiplicative group of integers modulo. Instead, we use Shamir's secret sharing scheme [9] . We divide the refreshed key into n shares, which are transferred to the server through n multiple paths. Our protocol shuffles the split shares among a group of dummy keys to further confuse adversaries.
Forward secrecy is an important security property to satisfy when updating a key [19] . It may be computationally infea-sible to compute the shared secret between two parties for a short-term session. However, adversaries can collect messages from the past session and decipher them with the shared secret compromised based on the eavesdropped security messages exchanged between two parties. All documents previously signed with the stolen or lost key should become invalid. Anderson presented a design of forwardsecure signatures to prevent such cases [4] . Specifically, Anderson's solution imposed an expiration time on every key pair. Upon expiration, a new key pair is generated based on the previous one. Once the key pair is updated, the old key is removed. As long as the documents were signed prior to the expiration, their validity is guaranteed. A problem arises when an impersonating client uses an invalid key to sign or encrypt documents. Katz [5] implemented a protocol that forces clients to respond correctly to the authentication questions issued by the server; otherwise, the clients are suspected to be involved in a man-in-the-middle attack. However, if the adversary changes the password stored at a server S for the corrupted client C and impersonates a server other than S, then the key can be inferred by exhaustively searching through the password dictionary. In [20] , the aforementioned protocol is modified such that the original password used to construct the server's response is saved as part of the authentication state information. Despite these efforts, the study by Adrian et al. [8] reported security vulnerabilities of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme that can be exploited with logjam attacks. Adrian et al. were able to compromise connections to top-7% of HTTP sites.
With our bluff forwarding method, clients select a random time period for the next bluff generation. We also randomly select the next cycle for the true key to be included in a bluff. Our protocol is free of key hijacking through manin-the-middle attacks since we do not use the passwordauthenticated key exchange protocols. Our protocol does not enforce explicit handshaking between two parties for secure message exchange. This is necessary because we need to have the two parties agree on a key given one-way push-based message delivery channel. Our protocol only leverages the TCP ACK messages to confirm the receipt of key updates on the server side. However, adversaries can tamper with the header of our message containers to spoil our key update process. To prevent this, we can have a header-less message container. We can split the bluff indication code and trigger code with the secret sharing scheme and keep them inside the encrypted body. Alternatively, we can also consider splitting the header field with the secret sharing scheme. Another option is to use message authentication code to prevent forgery of the header field. However, these security measures add more steps to our one-way key agreement procedure, which can further burden the two communicating parties. We can also consider adopting existing techniques for data integrity. For example, Yu et al. [21] proposed a technique of key updating and an authenticator-evolving mechanism with zero-knowledge privacy of the stored files for secure cloud data auditing. Another line of work that we can adapt is the work by Wang et al. [22] that considered a third-party auditor to verify the integrity of dynamic data updates on cloud storage. We plan to study the implications of these design choices as a future work.
Naranjo et al. [23] presented a symmetric key distribution in a multicast environment with the aid of a central server. Bettahar et al. [24] developed a secure key management protocol for multicast sessions where members can join and leave frequently. In our case, we focus on an environment where a client injects data through multiple paths to a data-collecting server. The two parties are assumed to exhibit a zero churn rate. We take advantage of this setting by forwarding secret keys that are split through secret sharing [10] . We use secret sharing such that our protocol can tolerate benign failures such as crash failure of the clientside transmitters or the server-side receivers. Although the aforementioned works address one-to-many group communication, our environment can evolve to the point where manyto-many communication between data-forwarding clients and consolidated data-collection servers can occur. In this environment, clients and servers should exhibit high up-time through redundancy and replication. A consistent and reliable key agreement in the event of fail-over to a replicated server is a challenging problem. This is another interesting subject for future study.
Naranjo et al. [23] warns of the possibility of denial-ofservice attacks by exploiting the key update protocol. In our case, adversaries may send a high volume of meaningless bluff messages to our servers. Our protocol is tolerant to such attacks as the server immediately drops a bluff message that is not tagged with a valid bluff indication code.
The above related works were not studied in an environment where a stream of big data chunks are constantly produced. Kozlov and Reyzin [12] argued that security can be enhanced through a more frequent update of keys based on their fast key update protocol. However, our experiments on a big data ingestion system showed that careless setting of update cycles can have an adverse effect on the data ingestion throughput and latency. Note that Apache Flume in particular uses multi-path ingestion channels for delivering data. We observed that for each ingestion path, the SSL protocol is executed to update the key for every delivery of a big data chunk. In fact, Flume employs ephemeral modes of transport layer security (TSL) for key agreement for every data chunk delivery session [25] . This has an adverse effect on the throughput and latency of normal messages. In this work, we split a symmetric key, which are distributed through multiple paths. With the parallel delivery of split keys, the key reconstruction can be faster, particularly when the key reconstructors do no block the normal message flow until it completes the reconstruction task. Another distinguishing feature is that the key update cycle is also configurable as opposed to updating a key for every session by default.
Popular systems such as Kafka and Flume implement publish/subscribe-based substrates for the large-scale and efficient ingestion and logging of big data. For example, LinkedIn is well-known for the implementation of Kafka's publish/subscribe feature to facilitate its big data processing ecosystem [26] . These big data systems take advantage of the asynchronous delivery that supports a push-based, asynchronous delivery of messages to interested subscribers.
In [27] , secret sharing is used to protect the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of messages from untrusted brokers. However, this work is based on a centralized authority that manages the shared secrets. This centralized approach can limit scalability and is subject to a single point of failure. Our work does not assume any central repository for storing shared secrets. In [10] , each client generates its own secret key that is split and distributed among multiple paths to a next-hop broker. The key is guaranteed to be delivered safely to the other end even in the presence of Byzantine nodes. These works based on secret sharing overlook the problem of updating keys securely.
Although there are many reliability solutions for messaging substrates for big data ingestion as surveyed in [28] , we sensed that research on secure key updates in this area is largely overlooked. In this paper, we designed a novel key refreshment protocol for a state-of-the-art and widely used data ingestion system (Apache Flume) and studied various implications on security and performance.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provided a clean-slate design of a practical protocol that utilizes the multi-path channels between two data ingestion endpoints for delivering updated keys securely over insecure networks. Rather than enforcing the key agreement and updates for every data chunk transfer, we send the pieces of secret key at a random interval. The secret pieces encapsulated inside a message container called a bluff are interleaved with normal messages and a group of fake keys. We showed that reconstructing the updated key from a set of randomly sniffed messages is computationally infeasible. Forwarding bluffs along with normal messages may introduce some overhead. However, we observed that the normal message latency can be improved by up to 4 percent with bluff forwarding compared to using SSL. With a longer interval, the throughput can also be improved while normal messages are still encrypted.
In this work, we focused on a solution for multi-path channels between a pair of sender and receiver. As a future work, we plan to study the effects of having multiple senders sending bluffs and normal messages to central receivers, i.e., many-to-one data ingestion. Additionally, in a real environment, redundant senders and receivers will be needed for fault tolerance and high availability. We plan to study the implication of this environment on the design and performance our protocol. 
